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We examined how expectation inﬂuences perception of complex objects. Participants discriminated between normal and distorted
images of famous faces or places. Word cues (mostly valid) indicated either the general category or the exact identity of the upcoming
image pair. Whereas category cues did not aﬀect performance, valid exemplar expectation led to performance beneﬁts. Furthermore, dis-
crimination was slower after exemplar cues from the incorrect category than after invalid exemplar cues from the correct category, indi-
cating costs of invalid category expectation. Thus, expectation of a speciﬁc exemplar facilitates perception of that object, but hinders
perception of an object from a diﬀerent category.
 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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As we interact with the world around us, we form expec-
tations regarding stimuli we are likely to encounter. How
do such expectations inﬂuence our perception? It is known
that attention to particular locations facilitates target
detection within those locations (Posner, Snyder, & David-
son, 1980). Similarly, expectation of simple visual attri-
butes (e.g., color, direction of motion) results in more
eﬃcient processing of subsequent stimuli containing those
attributes (e.g., Ball & Sekuler, 1981; Corbetta, Miezen,
& Dobmeyer, 1990). These behavioral changes are accom-
panied by increases in neural activity in cortical areas that
are specialized for processing the expected attributes (see
Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 2000 for a review). However, such
eﬀects are typically observed for highly simpliﬁed stimulus
displays (e.g., arrays of moving dots). In contrast, our aim
was to determine whether and how expectation facilitates
perception of real-world stimuli. Here we examined eﬀects
of expectation of categories, and of speciﬁc exemplars, on
discrimination of complex objects.0042-6989/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.visres.2007.11.017
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E-mail address: ampuri@ucdavis.edu (A.M. Puri).Few studies have examined the eﬀects of category or
exemplar expectation on object perception; those that have
leave several issues unresolved. For example, Reinitz,
Wright, and Loftus (1989) cued participants to the cate-
gory of upcoming objects and scenes, testing recognition
memory after a delay. They found enhanced recognition
for validly cued stimuli; however, without an immediate
measure of perceptual performance, it is unclear whether
expectation facilitated perception, rather than post-percep-
tual (e.g., semantic or memory-related) processes. More
recently, Faulkner, Rhodes, Palermo, Pellicano, and Fer-
guson (2002) reported a reaction time (RT) beneﬁt for dis-
crimination between normal and distorted versions of
famous faces after cueing with the correct vs. incorrect
name, suggesting that expectation of a speciﬁc exemplar
facilitates face perception. However, participants knew
the validity of the cue on each trial, confounding eﬀects
of exemplar expectation with increased alertness on valid
trials. Moreover, given the hypothesis that face perception
is ‘‘special’’ (Farah, 1996), it is unclear whether these ﬁnd-
ings generalize to other classes of complex visual objects.
Furthermore, whereas these studies emphasized facilitatory
eﬀects, the possibility of a negative inﬂuence of expectation
has not yet been suitably addressed.
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tion of speciﬁc exemplars and general object categories
inﬂuences perceptual processing of faces and other
objects. The task required discrimination between normal
and distorted versions of famous faces (as in Faulkner
et al., 2002) or places. We manipulated both exemplar
and category expectation by cueing with speciﬁc names
(exemplar cues), the words ‘‘FACE’’ and ‘‘PLACE’’ (cat-
egory cues), or rows of Xs (neutral cues). We chose
famous landmarks (or ‘‘places’’) as our second category
of complex stimuli, based on recent evidence for a corti-
cal area specialized for processing such stimuli (i.e., the
parahippocampal place area, or PPA, e.g., Epstein &
Kanwisher, 1998). By including two object categories,
we were able to test whether expectation eﬀects general-
ize across diﬀerent classes of stimuli, and more impor-
tant, whether invalid category expectation interferes
with object processing. Further, unlike Faulkner et al.
who informed participants of each cue’s validity prior
to target onset, we eliminated this alertness confound
such that cue validity became evident only after target
presentation, a strategy common in spatial attention
studies (Posner et al., 1980).
Our results demonstrate two diﬀerent eﬀects of exemplar
and category expectation on perception of complex stimuli.
Speciﬁcally, expectation of the correct exemplar led to facil-
itation, whereas expectation of an exemplar from a diﬀerent
category hindered discrimination performance.
2. Experiment 1
Here we sought to determine (1) whether knowing just
the category of an upcoming object can inﬂuence the eﬃ-
ciency of visual processing and (2) whether expectation of
the exact exemplar (relative to an incorrect exemplar) truly
beneﬁts performance. Thus, we manipulated expectation of
not only the exact identity of each target, but also its cate-
gory. Importantly, our cueing strategy ensured that partic-
ipants were not simply more alert on valid trials. On eachFig. 1. Design and procedure for Experiment 1. Target images were faces on h
cue was the correct name of the upcoming images (VE–VC condition). The
category (IE–VC) and the invalid exemplar–invalid category (IE–IC) condition
image appeared on the right or on the left.trial, a name cue was followed by one normal and one dis-
torted image of a famous face or place, presented side-by-
side. Participants indicated the location of the distorted
image (Fig. 1).
In the valid exemplar–valid category (VE–VC) condi-
tion (75% of trials; 480 out of 640 total trials), the cue
predicted the exact identity of the upcoming target;
e.g., the cue ‘‘GOLDIE HAWN’’ followed by a pair of
images of Goldie Hawn. The invalid exemplar–valid cat-
egory (IE–VC) condition (12.5% of trials; 80 out of 640)
correctly cued the target’s category, but not its identity;
e.g., ‘‘TOM HANKS’’ followed by images of Goldie
Hawn. Better performance in the VE–VC vs. IE–VC con-
dition would indicate an advantage of valid exemplar
expectation. The invalid exemplar–invalid category (IE–
IC) condition (12.5% of trials) involved expectation of
an exemplar from an entirely diﬀerent category of
objects; e.g., ‘‘TAJ MAHAL’’ followed by Goldie Hawn.
This third condition was critical for assessing eﬀects of
category expectation: if category information does inﬂu-
ence processing of subsequent stimuli, responses should
be slower for IE–IC relative to IE–VC trials. Note that
such an eﬀect cannot be a non-speciﬁc eﬀect of invalid-
ity, unexpectedness in general, or a simple cue–target
mismatch, as both IE–VC and IE–IC contain mis-
matches, unexpectedness, and are invalid with respect
to identity. Thus, it would necessarily be due to the
unique category invalidity in the IE–IC condition.
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Thirty-seven volunteers participated in Experiment 1.
Three of these did not achieve 60% accuracy on one or
both stimulus categories; their data were excluded from
further analysis. Participants in all experiments were UC
Davis undergraduate and graduate students, had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, and gave written informed
consent.alf of the trials and places on the other half. On the majority of trials, the
remaining trials were evenly divided between the invalid exemplar–valid
s. On each trial, participants pressed a key indicating whether the distorted
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Cues were names of famous people or places, presented
in capital letters (e.g., ‘‘GOLDIE HAWN’’ or ‘‘TAJ
MAHAL’’). Target images were a pair of grayscale photo-
graphs of the same person or place, one normal and one
distorted, presented simultaneously on either side of a cen-
tral ﬁxation point against a gray background, each sub-
tending approximately 4 · 5. The stimulus set contained
two distorted and one normal version for each of 20 faces
and 20 places. Face images were a subset of those used by
Faulkner et al. (2002), in which distortions involved posi-
tioning the mouth and eyes either closer to or farther from
the nose. Distorted place images contained a region origi-
nating near the center (varying somewhat in size depending
on the landmark’s architecture, but on average including
approximately one-third of the structure) that was skewed
to the right or left. All distortions were created in Adobe
Photoshop 6.0.
Trials began with a red ﬁxation point (500 ms), followed
by the cue (250 ms), a 1500 ms delay, and then the target
image pair (250 ms). Cue and target durations were the
same as those reported in Faulkner et al. (2002), whereas
the delay period was increased (from 250 ms) to maximize
the time available for cue processing and target expectation
without allowing the overall length of the experiment to
exceed approximately one hour. Participants indicated
whether the distorted image was on the right or left by
pressing a key, and were instructed to respond as quickly
and accurately as possible. Auditory feedback followed
the response, and the next trial began after a 1000 ms delay
during which the ﬁxation point was black.
Participants were aware that the majority of trials con-
tained valid cues (e.g., the cue ‘‘GOLDIE HAWN’’ fol-
lowed by images of Goldie Hawn). Trials were
counterbalanced such that all stimuli appeared with equal
frequency within each condition, and equally often on the
right and left. Trial orders were pseudorandomized with
respect to validity condition, stimulus category and
response (right/left), producing an unpredictable but bal-
anced distribution of conditions and responses across the
experiment. In this way, although each pair of normal
and distorted images appeared eight times over the course
of the entire experiment; six times in the VE–VC condition
(only three times in a given right/left conﬁguration) and
once in the IE–VC and IE–IC conditions, any impact on
performance due to repetition of speciﬁc image pairs would
apply equally across validity conditions.
Prior to the experiment, participants viewed the normal
version of each stimulus, reported whether they recognized
it (either by naming or providing information related to the
person or place), and were subsequently shown the name.
Across all experiments, participants on average recognized
80% of the faces and 70% of the places upon initial viewing.
Participants recognizing fewer than 75% within either cat-
egory were shown the stimuli from that category again
until they were able to name at least 75% of them (maxi-
mum of two additional presentations). Each participantcompleted 40 practice trials, followed by 640 experimental
trials, with brief breaks every 80 trials. The experiment was
performed using Presentation software (Versions 0.60-9.9,
www.neuro-bs.com).
2.1.3. Data analysis
For all experiments, mean reaction times (RTs) on cor-
rect trials and accuracy were analyzed with repeated mea-
sures ANOVAs; two-tailed t-tests were used for planned
pairwise comparisons. Trials with RTs < 250 ms or >3 s
were excluded from analysis (on average .3% of trials).
2.2. Results and discussion
Reaction time and accuracy data were entered into 2 · 3
ANOVAs, with stimulus category (faces/places) and valid-
ity (VE–VC/IE–VC/IE–IC) as factors (Fig. 2). A main
eﬀect of stimulus category (faster RTs for places than faces;
F(1,33) = 143.85, p < .0001) was due to the place distor-
tions being somewhat less subtle than the face distortions.
A main eﬀect of validity (F(2,66) = 32.75, p < .0001)
reﬂected longer RTs for IE–VC than VE–VC,
t(33) = 4.60, p < .0001, and longer RTs for IE–IC than
IE–VC, t(33) = 4.37, p < .0005 (IE–IC > VE–VC,
t(33) = 6.85, p < .0001). Stimulus category did not interact
signiﬁcantly with validity, F(2, 66) = 2.45, p = .09.
Slower discrimination in the IE–IC condition (‘‘TAJ
MAHAL’’ to Goldie Hawn) than in the IE–VC condition
(‘‘TOM HANKS’’ to Goldie Hawn) demonstrates that
incorrect category information interferes signiﬁcantly with
object processing. Importantly, this performance cost can-
not be due to the presence of invalid information per se,
because both conditions contain invalid exemplar informa-
tion. Instead, the RT diﬀerence reﬂects a cost of the viola-
tion of category expectation that is above and beyond the
cost of invalid exemplar expectation. Further analysis
showed that this eﬀect is signiﬁcant for both stimulus cate-
gories: t(33) = 2.28, p < .03 for faces; t(33) = 3.23, p < .005
for places.
Participants were faster when cued with the correct
name (VE–VC), than with a diﬀerent name from within
the same category (IE–VC), conﬁrming the beneﬁt of valid
exemplar cueing on face discrimination reported by Faulk-
ner et al. (2002). In contrast to that study, however, here
there is no possibility of an alertness confound. Further-
more, our results also show this beneﬁt for places, demon-
strating that the facilitatory inﬂuence of exemplar
expectation on perception of complex stimuli is not limited
to faces (t(33) = 3.85, p < .0005 for faces; t(33) = 3.37,
p < .001 for places).
Although our experiments emphasized RTs, we ana-
lyzed accuracy to verify that the observed RT eﬀects were
not due to speed/accuracy trade-oﬀs. Mean accuracy for
face discrimination (77.7%) was similar to that reported
by Faulkner et al. (2002) (79.9%), whereas accuracy for
places was near ceiling (95.6%), again reﬂecting the relative
ease of discriminating the place distortions (main eﬀect of
Fig. 2. Mean RTs for correct trials (left) and accuracy (right) in Experiment 1. **p < .01, *p < .05 (p-values here and in the following ﬁgures are derived
from two-tailed paired t-tests). VE, valid exemplar; IE, invalid exemplar; VC, valid category; IC, invalid category.
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eﬀect of validity, F(2, 66) = 7.47, p < .005, reﬂected higher
accuracy for VE–VC than IE–VC, t(33) = 2.59, p < .02,
with no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between IE–VC and IE–IC,
t(33) = 1.49, p = .15. Validity interacted marginally with
stimulus category, F(2, 66) = 3.02, p = .06, such that the
simple eﬀect of validity was signiﬁcant for faces,
F(2,66) = 6.22, p < .005, but not places, F(2, 66) < 1. Thus,
all signiﬁcant eﬀects were consistent with the RT analysis,
with no evidence of speed/accuracy trade-oﬀs.1
In summary, Experiment 1 produced two results: ﬁrst,
expectation of the incorrect category leads to slower dis-
crimination relative to expectation of the correct category.
Hence, prior category knowledge has an eﬀect over and
above any eﬀect of knowing an exemplar within the
category.
Second, we conﬁrm that exemplar expectation results in
a processing advantage for an expected vs. unexpected face
even when there is no alertness confound, and we extend
this ﬁnding to another stimulus category (places). How-
ever, it is not clear whether this advantage is truly a beneﬁt
of valid exemplar expectation, or is due to a cost generated
by the invalidity in the IE–VC condition (‘‘TOM HANKS’’
to Goldie Hawn). This is an important distinction: the lat-
ter would suggest only category beneﬁts (with the RT dif-
ference resulting simply from a breach of expectation in
the IE–VC condition), rather than exemplar beneﬁts. This
issue is addressed Experiment 2.1 For all experiments, analyses reported here include the subset of trials
containing stimuli with which a given participant may initially have been
unfamiliar, primarily to ensure a suﬃcient number of trials for all
conditions after exclusion of incorrect trials in the RT analysis. Results of
additional ANOVAs, in which trials containing these unfamiliar stimuli
(and/or cues) were excluded, were consistent with our original results for
both RTs and accuracy across all experiments. Results of planned t-tests
were also replicated despite reduced statistical power (due to the low
number of trials remaining in the invalid and neutral conditions), with the
exception of the RT diﬀerence between the IE–VC and IE–IC conditions
for faces in Experiment 1, which remained in the same direction but did
not reach signiﬁcance.3. Experiment 2
To determine if valid exemplar expectation results in a
beneﬁt beyond any eﬀect of category expectation, we
replaced the IE–VC condition with a condition that pro-
vides valid category information, but contains no invalid-
ity. In this new valid category (VC) condition, cues
consisted of the words ‘‘FACE’’ or ‘‘PLACE’’, and thus
contained no exemplar information. To maximize category
expectation, these cues were always valid. Under these con-
ditions, an advantage for VE–VC vs. VC trials must be
entirely attributed to a beneﬁt of exemplar expectation,
rather than an eﬀect of valid category information, or inter-
ference due to invalidity.
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Twenty-eight volunteers participated in Experiment 2.
Two did not achieve 60% accuracy on one or both stimulus
categories, and two others recognized very few of the stim-
uli (< 25%); the data from these four participants were
excluded from further analysis.
3.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
Cues in the VC condition were the words ‘‘FACE’’ and
‘‘PLACE’’. Participants were informed that the majority of
exemplar cues would be valid, and also that the pure cate-
gory cues were always valid (e.g., ‘‘FACE’’ would always
be followed by face images). All else remained identical
to Experiment 1.
3.2. Results and discussion
A repeated measures ANOVA on correct RTs, with
stimulus category and validity as factors, again showed
main eﬀects of stimulus category, F(1,23) = 105.72,
p < .0001, and validity, F(2, 46) = 20.85, p < .0001. Stimu-
lus category interacted with validity, F(2, 46) = 4.11,
p < .03, due to a greater diﬀerence between VE–VC and
VC conditions for faces than places, F(1, 23) = 4.72,
Fig. 3. Mean RTs for correct trials (left) and accuracy (right) in Experiment 2. **p < .01, *p < .05. Note that here the valid category cues consist of the
words ‘‘FACE’’ or ‘‘PLACE’’, and are always valid. VE, valid exemplar; IE, invalid exemplar; VC, valid category; IC, invalid category.
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VC, t(23) = 2.79, p < .02 for faces, t(23) = 3.83, p < .001
for places, consistent with the category eﬀect observed in
Experiment 1. Crucial to our question, participants were
faster in VE–VC than VC (t(23) = 3.42, p < .005 for
faces, t(23) = 2.66, p < .02 for places), demonstrating a
true beneﬁt due to expectation of the correct exemplar.
Thus, expectation of the exact identity of an upcoming tar-
get provides an advantage beyond any potential beneﬁt
conferred by prior knowledge of the category to which it
belongs.
Main eﬀects of stimulus category, F(1, 23) = 82.25,
p < .0001, and validity, F(2, 46) = 3.91, p < .03, were also
observed for accuracy. An interaction, F(2, 46) = 3.34,
p < .05, was due to a decrease in accuracy from VE–VC
to VC for faces, t(23) = 2.26, p < .04, but an increase from
VE–VC to VC for places, t(23) = 2.86, p < .01. Thus, the
advantage for faces in both RTs and accuracy indicates a
genuine exemplar cueing beneﬁt; the similar RT eﬀect for
places also suggests a true beneﬁt (although for places we
cannot rule out a potential speed/accuracy trade-oﬀ).
Having established that expecting the exact exemplar
results in a true beneﬁt for discrimination performance,
we now return to the category expectation eﬀect. In Exper-
iment 1 we showed that expecting the wrong object
increases RTs even more when it belongs to an unexpected
category. A question that still remains is whether this dif-
ference reﬂects a beneﬁt of expectation of the correct cate-
gory, as opposed to a cost incurred by expectation of the
incorrect category. Moreover, in the preceding experi-
ments, the invalid category condition contained both inva-
lid category and invalid exemplar information (e.g., ‘‘TAJ
MAHAL’’ cues Goldie Hawn); thus it is not clear how
invalid category information alone aﬀects performance.
Experiment 3 addresses these questions with a modiﬁed
design.
4. Experiment 3
To determine whether pure category expectation
enhances and/or impedes discrimination performance, weincluded both valid and invalid general category cues
(unlike in Experiment 2, where ‘‘FACE’’ and ‘‘PLACE’’
were always valid cues), as well as neutral cues. Here, in
the invalid category condition, category invalidity was
not combined with exemplar invalidity, thereby isolating
the inﬂuence of category information. The addition of neu-
tral trials provided a baseline, allowing assessment of costs
and beneﬁts. We similarly manipulated exemplar cue valid-
ity, in order to compare the eﬀects of exemplar expectation
and pure category expectation within a single experiment.
4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants
Twenty-ﬁve volunteers participated in Experiment 3.
Data from one participant, whose reaction times were
longer than 3 s on more than 10% of trials, were excluded.
4.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
Here trials were valid (60%), neutral (20%) or invalid
(20%). The cues indicated either an exemplar or general
category. This yielded a 3 · 2 · 2 design with validity, cue
type (exemplar/category), and stimulus category (faces/
places) as factors (Fig. 4). Two neutral cues were used,
‘‘XXXXX XXXXX’’ and ‘‘XXXXX’’, approximating the
average length of exemplar and category cues, respectively.
To bring overall performance on faces and places closer
together, we reduced the set of faces and places to 16 each,
eliminating several for which the discrimination was partic-
ularly diﬃcult, or which many participants could not iden-
tify upon initial viewing. Also, the place distortions were
made more subtle by using the ‘‘pinch’’ and ‘‘spherize’’
functions in Adobe Photoshop (instead of skewing as in
preceding experiments). These changes reduced overall dif-
ferences in RTs and accuracy between face and place trials
(see Section 4.2).
The new design along with the modiﬁed number of stim-
uli resulted in 192 trials in each of the two valid conditions
(valid exemplar–valid category, or VE–VC, and valid cate-
gory, or VC), and 64 trials in each neutral (neutral exem-
plar, or NE, and neutral category, or NC) and invalid
Fig. 4. Design and procedure for Experiment 3. Target images were faces on half of the trials and places on the other half. Cues could be the name of a
famous person or place (exemplar cue), the general category ‘‘FACE’’ or ‘‘PLACE’’ (category cue), or a row of Xs (neutral cue). The majority of cues were
valid, while the rest were evenly divided between neutral and invalid. Participants indicated whether the distorted image appeared on the right or left.
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category, or IC) condition (half faces and half places in
each condition). As before, stimuli and responses were
counterbalanced, conditions interleaved, and trial orders
pseudorandomized.
Participants again were informed that the majority of
cues would be valid, and also that neutral cues were non-
predictive. The timing and procedure remained the same
as in Experiments 1 and 2; each participant ﬁrst viewed
the normal versions of the stimuli, performed a short prac-
tice session, and then completed 640 experimental trials
with brief breaks every 80 trials.
4.2. Results and discussion
A 3 · 2 · 2 repeated measures ANOVA on correct RTs
revealed a main eﬀect of validity, F(2, 46) = 22.74,
p < .0001, no eﬀect of cue type, F(1,23) < 1, and a main
eﬀect of stimulus category, F(1, 23) = 83.90, p < .0001
(Fig. 5). This last eﬀect showed faster RTs for places than
faces (685 ms vs. 748 ms), although this diﬀerence was
now much reduced due to our stimulus modiﬁcations.
The 3-way interaction between validity, cue type, and stim-
ulus category was signiﬁcant, F(2, 46) = 5.71, p < .01, due
to exemplar cues producing a signiﬁcant validity eﬀect,
F(2, 46) = 31.32, p < .0001, with a further interaction of
validity by stimulus category, F(2, 46) = 5.37, p < .01.
The latter indicated costs (IE–IC vs. NE) for both faces
and places, t(23) = 4.29, p < .0005, t(23) = 3.27, p < .005,
respectively, but a beneﬁt (VE–VC vs. NE) only for faces,
t(23) = 2.88, p < .01, not places, t(23) = .72, p = .5. In
contrast, category cues showed no eﬀect of validity, F(2,
46) = 1.42, p = .25, and no validity by stimulus category
interaction, F(2, 46) = 1.36, p = .27.For accuracy, only the eﬀect of stimulus category
approached signiﬁcance, F(1, 23) = 4.0, p = .06, with
higher accuracy for places than faces (87.5% vs. 84.5%).
A trend toward lower accuracy after invalid cues (86.5%,
86.3% for valid and neutral, respectively, vs. 85.0% for
invalid) produced a marginal eﬀect of validity, F(2,
46) = 2.91, p = .07.
These results clearly demonstrate both beneﬁts of valid
exemplar expectation, particularly for faces, and costs of
invalid category expectation, but only following exemplar
cues. The apparent lack of a signiﬁcant exemplar beneﬁt
for places (neutral vs. valid) we believe was due to an
anomaly in the neutral condition (see Jonides & Mack,
1984), as is evident from the large RT diﬀerence in the
means of the two neutral conditions for places (Fig. 5, left
panel). Indeed, when we tested for a diﬀerence between
VE–VC (‘‘TAJ MAHAL’’ to Taj Mahal) and VC
(‘‘PLACE’’ to Taj Mahal) trials (an equally appropriate
comparison for detecting exemplar beneﬁts) a signiﬁcant
eﬀect was present (t(23) = 2.43, p < .03), although smaller
in magnitude than for faces. Thus, exemplar cueing beneﬁts
are present for both faces and places; the magnitude diﬀer-
ence may be related to participants having less initial famil-
iarity with the place stimuli (70% recognition for places vs.
83% for faces).
Because only exemplar expectation produced signiﬁcant
eﬀects on performance, we conducted an additional exper-
iment in which we provided only category cues. We rea-
soned that in Experiment 3, perhaps participants ignored
the category cues, given that exemplar cues provide more
information overall. We thus repeated the experiment but
with exemplar cues removed, thereby encouraging partici-
pants to rely on the category cues. However, even when
all cues were at the category level, no eﬀect of validity
Fig. 5. Mean RTs for correct trials (left) and accuracy (right) in Experiment 3. **p < .01. VE, valid exemplar; IE, invalid exemplar; VC, valid category; IC,
invalid category.
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performance costs and beneﬁts occur only when exemplar
information is provided.2 Hence, it appears that the cate-
gory eﬀect observed in Experiments 1 and 2 depends
entirely on the cost generated by the expectation of an
exemplar from the wrong category.
5. General discussion
This series of experiments shows that exemplar expecta-
tion inﬂuences the eﬃciency with which an upcoming face
or place image is processed. Thus, expectation aﬀects per-
ceptual processing not only of simple stimulus features,
but also of complex, real-world stimuli. Although a previ-
ous study (Faulkner et al., 2002) reported an inﬂuence of
exemplar cueing on face perception, here we establish that
it is exemplar expectation itself (as opposed to non-speciﬁc
arousal) that enhances discrimination of valid targets.
Moreover, whereas functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies have revealed that activity in extrastriate
areas specialized for face processing is modulated by atten-
tion and imagery, and therefore cannot be exclusively auto-
matic and stimulus-driven (O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000;
Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver, 1998), our results demon-
strate that perception of faces can be facilitated over and
above any inherent advantage faces may possess as potent
biological stimuli, as this facilitation occurs even in the
absence of competing stimuli. Finally, as shown in Exper-
iment 1, whereas expectation of the correct exemplar pro-
duces a beneﬁt, expectation of an exemplar from the
incorrect category results in a cost. Notably, despite sug-
gestions that face processing relies on a unique, indepen-2 To test whether these category cues can be used at all, we conducted an
experiment identical to Experiment 3, except requiring a much coarser
discrimination (upright vs. inverted). Here, both exemplar and category
cue validity signiﬁcantly aﬀected RTs (both ps < .005; though exemplar
eﬀects were greater: cue type · validity interaction, p < .0005). Although
with such a gross discrimination the level at which cues inﬂuenced
performance is unclear (e.g., features vs. objects), this nonetheless
conﬁrms that pure category cues can generate expectation eﬀects.dent resource that suﬀers only from face-speciﬁc capacity
limits (Jenkins, Lavie, & Driver, 2003), here both face
and place processing suﬀer from costs due to invalid cate-
gory expectation.
Generally, our ﬁndings are consistent with previous
reports of the inﬂuence of expectation on perception of
low-level stimulus attributes, and interactions of imagery
with perception of simple stimuli (Farah, 1985; Ishai & Sagi,
1997). However, in addition to demonstrating that expecta-
tion aﬀects perception of more complex, realistic stimuli,
our study also provides a novel dissociation between facili-
tation due to expectation of the exact exemplar, and interfer-
ence induced by expectation of an exemplar from a diﬀerent
category. Hence, although cueing an exact representation
(‘‘activating’’ the most relevant neural population) boosts
subsequent stimulus processing (exemplar beneﬁt), activa-
tion of an overlapping population representing a diﬀerent
exemplar from the same category proves to be less costly
(assuming some shared features) than activation of a popu-
lation associated with a perceptually distinct category of
stimuli (presumably with little feature overlap).
It is important to note that the interference caused by
expectation of the inappropriate category depended
entirely on expectation of a speciﬁc exemplar; a striking
result of Experiment 3 is that prior knowledge of the cate-
gory alone had no detectable inﬂuence on performance.
Based on traditional theories concerning stages of object
recognition and categorization (Biederman, 1987; Rosch,
1978), as well as recent data demonstrating that partici-
pants discern an object’s category more quickly than they
identify it as a particular exemplar (Grill-Spector & Kanw-
isher, 2005), we hypothesized that general category expec-
tation might facilitate the categorization stage if target
processing time is severely restricted. We tested this notion
with an experiment identical to Experiment 3, except with
reduced target duration (70 ms). Results exactly replicated
Experiment 3 (although overall performance was lower),
showing no eﬀect of category cue validity (further target
duration reductions were not feasible, as they resulted in
near-chance performance).
596 A.M. Puri, E. Wojciulik / Vision Research 48 (2008) 589–597Given recent experiments supporting the hypothesis
that object category information in the form of low spa-
tial frequencies is rapidly projected to prefrontal regions
and provides top-down constraints on feed-forward
object recognition processes (Bar et al., 2006), it is some-
what surprising that general category foreknowledge does
not appear to inﬂuence perception in our study. On the
other hand, exemplar cues may have the unique eﬀect
of advancing the system beyond the categorization stage
via feedback pathways prior to stimulus onset, providing
a substantial ‘‘head-start’’ for processing expected
objects, but eﬀectively a ‘‘false-start’’ when stimuli are
from the unexpected category. However, it is still possi-
ble that category cues would inﬂuence performance when
a task requires discrimination at the level of object cate-
gories rather than exemplars (or subexemplars, as in our
task).
Our ﬁnding that exemplar expectation produces beneﬁts
and costs, whereas category expectation alone produces
neither, may provide insight regarding recent fMRI studies
that appeared to produce inconsistent results. Some
reported increased activity in ventral object-processing
areas during expectation (prior to stimulus appearance),
whereas others did not. The resolution may depend in part
on the nature of the expected stimuli: speciﬁc exemplars vs.
more general categories. Thus, increases in activity in
object-selective areas such as the FFA (fusiform face area;
Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) and PPA during
object expectation occurred when participants generated
representations of speciﬁc exemplars from the region’s pre-
ferred category (Lepsien & Nobre, 2007; O’Craven &
Kanwisher, 2000; Pinsk, Kastner, Desimone, & Ungerleid-
er, 2000; Ranganath, Cohen, Dam, & D’Esposito, 2004); in
contrast, when category information alone (e.g., faces in
general) was suﬃcient for performing the task, expecta-
tion-related modulations in these regions were weaker
and less reliable (Corbetta et al., 2005; Puri, Hansen, Buon-
ocore, & Wojciulik, 2003). Consistent with this observa-
tion, recent data suggest that more speciﬁc cues (e.g.,
‘‘Penn bookstore’’ vs. ‘‘classroom’’) generate greater antic-
ipatory activity in PPA (Epstein & Higgins, 2007). Thus,
expectation may optimally engage category-selective visual
areas when based on a speciﬁc exemplar from the preferred
category. Indeed, it is plausible that such preparatory activ-
ity reﬂects an important component of the neural basis for
the expectation-induced facilitation and interference
reported here.
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